الاتحاد الأوروبي نظام الانبعاثات الانبعاثات

نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لتجارة الانبعاثات (الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس)

وأوضح نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لتجارة الانبعاثات.

ويعد نظام االتحاد األوروبي لتداول االنبعاثات) إيتس (حجر الزاوية في سياسة االتحاد األوروبي لمكافحة تغير المناخ وأداة رئيسية للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة من حيث التكلفة. هذا هو أول سوق الكربون الرئيسي في العالم ولا يزال أكبر واحد.

تعمل في 31 دولة (جميع دول الاتحاد الأوروبي البالغ عددها 28 دولة بالإضافة إلى أيسلندا وليختنشتاين والنرويج) تحد من الانبعاثات من أكثر من 11000 منشأة تستخدم الطاقة الثقيلة (محطات توليد الكهرباء والمنشآت الصناعية) وتغطي شركات الطيران العاملة بين هذه الدول حوالي 45٪ من غازات الدفيئة في الاتحاد الأوروبي الانبعاثات.

للحصول على نظرة عامة مفصلة، ​​انظر:

A 'كاب والتجارة' النظام.

تعمل إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي على مبدأ "الحد والتجارة".

يتم تحديد سقف على إجمالي كمية غازات الدفيئة معينة التي يمكن أن تنبعث من المنشآت التي يغطيها النظام. ويتم تخفيض الحد الأقصى بمرور الوقت بحيث ينخفض ​​إجمالي الانبعاثات.

وفي إطار الحد الأقصى، تتلقى الشركات أو تشتري بدلات الانبعاثات التي يمكن أن تتاجر بها مع بعضها البعض حسب الحاجة. ويمكنهم أيضا شراء كميات محدودة من القروض الدولية من مشاريع إنقاذ الانبعاثات في جميع أنحاء العالم. ويضمن الحد الأقصى لعدد البدلات المتاحة أن يكون لها قيمة.

وبعد كل سنة، يجب على الشركة أن تسلم ما يكفي من البدلات لتغطية جميع انبعاثاتها، وإلا فرضت غرامات كبيرة. وإذا خفضت الشركة انبعاثاتها، فإنها يمكن أن تحتفظ بدلات احتياطية لتغطية احتياجاتها المستقبلية أو أن تبيعها إلى شركة أخرى تقل عن المخصصات.

فالتجارة تجلب المرونة التي تضمن خفض الانبعاثات حيث تكلف أقل من ذلك. كما يعزز سعر الكربون القوي الاستثمار في التكنولوجيات النظيفة والمنخفضة الكربون.

الملامح الرئيسية للمرحلة 3 (2018-2020)

وقد أصبح الاتحاد الأوروبي للاتصالات الأوروبية الآن في مرحلته الثالثة - يختلف كثيرا عن المرحلتين 1 و 2.

التغييرات الرئيسية هي:

يتم تطبيق سقف واحد على مستوى الاتحاد الأوروبي على الانبعاثات بدلا من النظام السابق للقبعات الوطنية يعتبر المزاد هو الطريقة الافتراضية لتخصيص البدلات (بدلا من التخصيص المجاني)، وتنطبق قواعد التوزيع المنسقة على البدلات التي لا تزال تمنح مجانا. تضمنت الغازات 300 مليون بدلات خصصت في احتياطي المشردين الجدد لتمويل نشر تكنولوجيات مبتكرة للطاقة المتجددة واحتجاز الكربون وتخزينه من خلال برنامج 300 نر.

القطاعات والغازات المشمولة.

ويغطي النظام القطاعات والغازات التالية مع التركيز على الانبعاثات التي يمكن قياسها والإبلاغ عنها والتحقق منها بمستوى عال من الدقة:

من ثاني أكسيد الكربون (CO2) من قطاعات توليد الطاقة والطاقة الحرارية كثيفة الاستخدام للطاقة بما في ذلك مصافي النفط والأعمال الحديدية وإنتاج الحديد والألمنيوم والمعادن والاسمنت والجير والزجاج والسيراميك ولب الورق والورق والكرتون والأحماض والمواد الكيميائية العضوية السائبة أكسيد النيتروز التجاري (N 2 O) من إنتاج أحماض النيتريك والأديبيك والجليوكسيليك ومركبات الكربون الهيدروكلورية فلورية غليوكسال (بكس) من إنتاج الألومنيوم.

المشاركة في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي إلزامية للشركات في هذه القطاعات، ولكن.

في بعض القطاعات فقط النباتات فوق حجم معين يتم تضمين بعض المنشآت الصغيرة يمكن استبعادها إذا وضعت الحكومات تدابير مالية أو غيرها من شأنها أن خفض انبعاثاتها من قبل ما يعادلها في قطاع الطيران، حتى عام 2018 ينطبق إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي فقط على الرحلات الجوية بين المطارات الواقعة في المنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية (إيا).

تقديم تخفيضات في الانبعاثات.

وقد أثبتت إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي أن وضع سعر على الكربون والتداول في ذلك يمكن أن تعمل. وتنخفض الانبعاثات من المنشآت في المخطط حسب الغرض - بنحو 5٪ مقارنة مع بداية المرحلة 3 (2018) (انظر أرقام 2018).

وفي عام 2020، ستكون الانبعاثات من القطاعات التي يغطيها النظام أقل بنسبة 21 في المائة عما كانت عليه في عام 2005.

تطوير سوق الكربون.

أنشئت في عام 2005، والاتحاد الأوروبي إتس هو أول وأكبر نظام دولي للانبعاثات الانبعاثات في العالم، وهو ما يمثل أكثر من ثلاثة أرباع التجارة الدولية للكربون.

كما تلهم إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي تطوير تجارة الانبعاثات في بلدان ومناطق أخرى. ويهدف الاتحاد الأوروبي إلى ربط إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي مع أنظمة أخرى متوافقة.

التشريعات الرئيسية للاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية.

30/04/2017 - نسخة موحدة من التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الذي ينشئ مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس رقم 96/61 / إيك 23/04/2009 - التوجيه رقم 2009/29 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي المعدل للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نطاق خطة تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة في الجماعة 19/11/2008 - التوجيه 2008/101 / إيك والبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الذي يعدل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك بحيث يشمل أنشطة الطيران في مخطط تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة 27/10/2004 - الأمر التوجيهي 2004/101 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي و المجلس الذي يعدل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الذي ينشئ خطة لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة فيما يتعلق بآليات مشروع بروتوكول كيوتو 13/10/2003 - الأمر التوجيهي 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والاتحاد الأوروبي نيل التي تضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك.

تقارير سوق الكربون.

23/11/2017 - كوم (2017) 693 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 01/02/2017 - كوم (2017) 48 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 18/11/2018 - كوم 2018) 576 - تقرير عن أداء سوق الكربون الأوروبي 14/11/2018 - كوم (2018) 652 - حالة سوق الكربون الأوروبي في عام 2018.

تنقيح إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي للمرحلة 3.

04/02/2018 - استنتاجات المجلس الأوروبي المؤرخة 4 شباط / فبراير 2018 (انظر الاستنتاجين 23 و 24) 18/03/2018 - إرشادات بشأن تفسير المرفق الأول لتوجيه الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية (باستثناء أنشطة الطيران) 18/03/2018 - إرشادات ورقة تعريفية لمولدات الكهرباء 06/04/2009 - بيان صحفي صادر عن المجلس حول اعتماد مجموعة المناخ والطاقة 12/12/2008 - استنتاجات رئاسة المجلس الأوروبي (11 و 12 ديسمبر 2008) 12/12/2008 - المجلس الأوروبي بيان بشأن استخدام عائدات المزادات 23/01/2008 - اقتراح بتوجيه من البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس بتعديل التوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نظام تداول بدل غازات الدفيئة في المجتمع 23 / 01/2008 - وثيقة عمل موظفي اللجنة - وثيقة مصاحبة للاقتراح الخاص بتوجيه للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس المعدل للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك من أجل تحسين وتوسيع نطاق نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي لبدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة - تقييم الأثر.

التنفيذ.

04/07/2018 - مشروع لائحة تنظيمية بشأن تحديد الاستحقاقات الائتمانية الدولية 05/06/2018 - مشروع لائحة بشأن تحديد استحقاقات الائتمان الدولي 05/05/2018 لائحة المفوضية رقم الاتحاد الأوروبي رقم 389/2018 بتاريخ 2 مايو 2018 بشأن إنشاء السجل الاتحادي إلى التوجيه رقم 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، والمرسومين رقم 280/2004 / إيك رقم 406/2009 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، وإلغاء لائحة المفوضية الأوروبية رقم 920/2018 و لا 1193/2018 نص ذو صلة بالمنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية 18/11/2018 - لائحة اللجنة التي تنشئ سجل الاتحاد لفترة التداول التي تبدأ في 1 يناير 2018 وفترات التداول اللاحقة من مخطط الإتجار في الانبعاثات بالاتحاد وفقا للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك والبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس، والمقرر 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي، وتعديل اللائحة التنفيذية رقم 2216/2004 والاتحاد الأوروبي رقم 920/2018 - لم تنشر بعد في الجريدة الرسمية 07 / 10/2018 - كوميسيون ريجول (الاتحاد الأوروبي) رقم 920/2018 لنظام موحد ومضمون للسجلات عملا بالتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي والقرار رقم 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس - بما في ذلك التغييرات التي أدخلتها لائحة 18 نوفمبر 2018 08/10/2008 - لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 994/2008 لنظام موحد ومضمون من السجلات وفقا للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك للبرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي - القرار رقم 280/2004 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس - الإصدار الساري حتى 31 ديسمبر 2018 26/10/2007 - قرار اللجنة المشتركة للمنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية رقم 146/2007 الذي يربط الاتحاد الأوروبي بالإنكليزية إتس مع النرويج وأيسلندا وليختنشتاين 13/11 / 2006 - قرار اللجنة 2006/780 / إيك بشأن تجنب الازدواجية المزدوجة لانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في إطار خطة الجماعة المعنية بتداول الانبعاثات لأنشطة المشاريع بموجب بروتوكول كيوتو عملا بالتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك الصادر عن البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس (ن) (2006) 5362) 21/12/2004 - نسخة موحدة من لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 2216/2004 بشأن نظام موحد ومضمون للسجلات معدلة بموجب لائحة المفوضية رقم 916/2007 المؤرخة 31 يوليو / تموز 2007، لائحة المفوضية (إيك) رقم 994/2008 المؤرخة 8 أكتوبر 2008 ولائحة المفوضية (يو) رقم 920/2018 المؤرخة 7 أكتوبر 2018 - نسخة لا تشمل التغييرات التي أدخلتها لائحة 18 نوفمبر 2018.

تطبيق ضريبة القيمة المضافة.

التاريخ التشريعي للتوجيه 2003/87 / إيك.

العمل قبل اقتراح اللجنة.

08/02/2000 - كوم (2000) 87 - ورقة خضراء بشأن الاتجار بانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة في إطار الاتحاد الأوروبي ولاية ونتائج الفريق العامل الأول التابع للجنة إكب: الآليات المرنة 04/09/2001 - المحضر الموجز لاجتماع التشاور مع أصحاب المصلحة (مع الصناعة والمنظمات غير الحكومية البيئية) 19/05/1999 - كوم (1999) 230 - التحضير لتنفيذ بروتوكول كيوتو 03/06/1998 - كوم (1998) 353 - تغير المناخ - نحو استراتيجية ما بعد كيوتو للاتحاد الأوروبي نطاق إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي : 07/2007 - المنشآت الصغيرة داخل الاتحاد الأوروبي نظام تداول الانبعاثات 10/2006 - إدراج أنشطة إضافية والغازات في الاتحاد الأوروبي نظام تداول الانبعاثات مزيد من المواءمة وزيادة القدرة على التنبؤ: 12/2006 - النهج إلى الداخلين الجدد والإغلاق 10/2006 - مزاد بدائل انبعاث ثاني أآسيد الكربون في الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس 10/2006 - مواءمة منهجيات التخصيص 12/2006 - تقرير عن القدرة التنافسية الدولية فريق عمل إكب المعني بتداول الانبعاثات في استعراض إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي 15/06/2007 - التقرير النهائي للمي 4 بشأن الربط مع أنظمة تجارة الانبعاثات في الدول الثالثة 22/05/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الثالث حول مزيد من المواءمة وزيادة القدرة على التنبؤ 26/04/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الثاني حول الامتثال الصارم وإنفاذ القانون 09/03/2007 - التقرير النهائي للاجتماع الأول بشأن نطاق التوجيه.

أكتوبر 2001.

22/01/2002 - ورقة غير رسمية عن أوجه التآزر بين اقتراح المفوضية الأوروبية بشأن الاتجار بالانبعاثات (كوم (2001) 581) وتوجيه الاتفاقية الدولية لوقاية النباتات 23/10/2001 - كوم (2001) 581 - اقتراح بشأن توجيه إطاري لتداول انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة الأوروبية.

رد فعل اللجنة على قراءة الاقتراح في المجلس والبرلمان (بما في ذلك الموقف المشترك للمجلس)

18/07/2003 - كوم (2003) 463 - رأي اللجنة بشأن تعديلات البرلمان الأوروبي على الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اقتراح توجيه البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس الأوروبي 20/06/2003 - كوم (2003) 364 - الاتصال باللجنة إلى البرلمان الأوروبي بشأن الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اعتماد توجيه يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك 18/03/2003 - الموقف المشترك (إيك ) لا 28/2003 - الموقف المشترك للمجلس بشأن اعتماد توجيه يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك 27/11/2002 - كوم (2002) 680 - اقتراح معدل لتوجيه من البرلمان الأوروبي والمجلس يضع مخططا لتداول بدل انبعاث غازات الدفيئة داخل الجماعة وتعديل توجيه المجلس 96/61 / إيك فاق.

افتح جميع الأسئلة.

أسئلة وأجوبة بشأن نظام الاتحاد الأوروبي المنقح لتداول الانبعاثات (كانون الأول / ديسمبر 2008)

ما هو الهدف من تداول الانبعاثات؟

والهدف من نظام االتحاد األوروبي لتداول االنبعاثات هو مساعدة الدول األعضاء في االتحاد األوروبي على تحقيق التزاماتها للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة أو الحد منها بطريقة فعالة من حيث التكلفة. والسماح للشركات المشاركة بشراء أو بيع بدلات الانبعاثات يعني أن التخفيضات في الانبعاثات يمكن تحقيقها بأقل تكلفة.

إن إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي هو حجر الزاوية في استراتيجية الاتحاد الأوروبي لمكافحة تغير المناخ. وهو أول نظام تجاري دولي لانبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون في العالم، وقد بدأ العمل به منذ عام 2005. واعتبارا من الأول من يناير / كانون الثاني 2008، فإنه لا ينطبق فقط على الدول الأعضاء في الاتحاد الأوروبي البالغ عددها 27 دولة، وإنما ينطبق أيضا على الأعضاء الثلاثة الآخرين في المنطقة الاقتصادية الأوروبية - النرويج وأيسلندا وليختنشتاين. وهي تغطي حاليا أكثر من 000 10 منشأة في قطاعي الطاقة والصناعة وهما مسؤولان جماعيا عن ما يقرب من نصف انبعاثات الاتحاد الأوروبي من ثاني أكسيد الكربون و 40 في المائة من مجموع انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة. ومن شأن إدخال تعديل على توجيه الاتحاد الأوروبي بشأن التجارة الإلكترونية المتفق عليه في تموز / يوليه 2008 أن يجلب قطاع الطيران إلى النظام اعتبارا من عام 2018.

كيف يعمل تداول الانبعاثات؟

و إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي هو نظام "سقف والتجارة"، وهذا يعني أنه يحد من المستوى العام للانبعاثات المسموح بها ولكن، في حدود هذا، يسمح للمشاركين في النظام لشراء وبيع البدلات كما تتطلب. هذه البدلات هي "عملة" التداول المشتركة في قلب النظام. يمنح أحد البدلات لصاحب الحق الحق في انبعاث طن واحد من ثاني أكسيد الكربون أو ما يعادله من غازات الدفيئة الأخرى. ويؤدي الحد الأقصى لعدد البدلات إلى نشوء ندرة في السوق.

وفي فترة التداول الأولى والثانية في إطار هذا المخطط، كان على الدول الأعضاء أن تضع خططا وطنية للتخصيص تحدد المستوى الكلي لانبعاثاتها، وكم عدد البدلات التي تصدرها كل منشأة في بلدها. وفي نهاية كل سنة يجب أن تسلم المنشآت بدلات تعادل انبعاثاتها. ويمكن للشركات التي تبقي انبعاثاتها دون مستوى بدلاتها أن تبيع بدلاتها الزائدة. ويواجه أولئك الذين يواجهون صعوبة في الحفاظ على انبعاثاتهم وفقا لبدلاتهم خيارا بين اتخاذ تدابير للحد من انبعاثاتهم الخاصة - مثل الاستثمار في تكنولوجيا أكثر كفاءة أو استخدام مصادر طاقة أقل كثافة من الكربون - أو شراء البدلات الإضافية التي يحتاجونها في السوق ، أو مزيج من الاثنين. ومن المرجح أن تحدد هذه الخيارات بتكاليف نسبية. وبهذه الطريقة، تخفض الانبعاثات حيثما يكون ذلك أكثر فعالية من حيث التكلفة.

كم من الوقت كان الاتحاد الأوروبي إتس تعمل؟

تم إطلاق إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي في 1 يناير 2005. استمرت فترة التداول الأولى لمدة ثلاث سنوات حتى نهاية عام 2007 وكانت مرحلة "التعلم بالممارسة" للتحضير لفترة التداول الثانية الحاسمة. وبدأت فترة التداول الثانية في 1 يناير 2008 وتستمر لمدة خمس سنوات حتى نهاية عام 2018. وتأتي أهمية فترة التداول الثانية من كونها تتزامن مع فترة الالتزام الأولى لبروتوكول كيوتو، يجب على البلدان الصناعية أن تحقق أهدافها للحد من انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة أو الحد منها. وبالنسبة لفترة التداول الثانية، تم تحديد انبعاثات الاتحاد الأوروبي لانبعاثات غازات الدفيئة بنحو 6.5٪ دون مستويات عام 2005 للمساعدة على ضمان أن الاتحاد الأوروبي ككل، والدول الأعضاء على حدة، يفي بالتزامات كيوتو.

ما هي الدروس الرئيسية المستفادة من التجربة حتى الآن؟

وقد وضعت إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي سعرا على الكربون وأثبتت أن الاتجار في انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة يعمل. وقد أنشأت فترة التداول الأولى بنجاح التداول الحر لبدلات الانبعاث في جميع أنحاء الاتحاد الأوروبي، ووضعت البنية التحتية اللازمة، ووضعت سوقا ديناميكية للكربون. وقد تكون الفائدة البيئية للمرحلة الأولى محدودة بسبب التوزيع المفرط للبدلات في بعض الدول الأعضاء وبعض القطاعات، ويرجع ذلك أساسا إلى الاعتماد على إسقاطات الانبعاثات قبل أن تصبح بيانات الانبعاثات التي تم التحقق منها متاحة في إطار إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي. وعندما أبرز نشر بيانات الانبعاثات المؤكدة لعام 2005 هذا "الإفراط في تخصيص"، كان رد فعل السوق كما هو متوقع من خلال خفض سعر السوق للبدلات. وقد أتاح توافر بيانات الانبعاثات المؤكدة للجنة أن تكفل تحديد الحد الأقصى للمخصصات الوطنية في إطار المرحلة الثانية على مستوى يؤدي إلى تخفيضات حقيقية في الانبعاثات.

وإلى جانب التأكيد على الحاجة إلى بيانات تم التحقق منها، أثبتت التجربة حتى الآن أن زيادة المواءمة داخل إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي أمر حتمي لضمان أن يحقق الاتحاد الأوروبي أهدافه في خفض الانبعاثات على الأقل بتكلفة وبحد أدنى من التشوهات التنافسية. والحاجة إلى مزيد من المواءمة أوضح فيما يتعلق بكيفية تحديد الحد الأقصى لبدلات الانبعاثات الإجمالية.

وتبين الفترتان التجاريتان الأوليان أيضا أن الطرق الوطنية المختلفة على نطاق واسع لتخصيص البدلات للمنشآت تهدد المنافسة العادلة في السوق الداخلية. وعلاوة على ذلك، هناك حاجة إلى قدر أكبر من المواءمة والتوضيح والتنقيح فيما يتعلق بنطاق النظام، وإمكانية الحصول على ائتمانات من مشاريع خفض الانبعاثات خارج الاتحاد الأوروبي، وشروط ربط النظام الأوروبي لتكنولوجيا الاتصالات بالأنظمة التجارية للانبعاثات في أماكن أخرى، متطلبات تقديم التقارير.

ما هي التغييرات الرئيسية في إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي، ومتى سيتم تطبيقها؟

وستطبق التغييرات المتفق عليها للتصميم اعتبارا من فترة التداول الثالثة، أي يناير / كانون الثاني 2018. وبينما ستبدأ الأعمال التحضيرية فورا، لن تتغير القواعد السارية حتى يناير 2018 لضمان الحفاظ على الاستقرار التنظيمي.

وستكون معاهدة التجارة الأوروبية للاتحاد الأوروبي في الفترة الثالثة نظاما أكثر كفاءة وأكثر اتساقا وعدلا.

وتتحقق زيادة الكفاءة من خالل فرتة تداول أطول) 8 سنوات بدال من 5 سنوات (، وخفض انبعاثات قوي ومتراجع سنويا) انخفاض بنسبة 21٪ يف عام 2020 مقارنة بعام 2005 (وزيادة كبرية يف كمية املزادات) من أقل من 4٪ في المرحلة 2 إلى أكثر من النصف في المرحلة 3).

وتم الاتفاق على مزيد من المواءمة في العديد من المجالات، بما في ذلك فيما يتعلق بتحديد الحد الأقصى (وهو سقف على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي بدلا من الحدود الوطنية في المرحلتين 1 و 2) والقواعد المتعلقة بالتخصيص الحر الانتقالي.

وازدادت عدالة النظام زيادة كبيرة من خلال التحرك نحو قواعد التخصيص المجاني على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي للمنشآت الصناعية وبإدخال آلية لإعادة التوزيع تخول للدول الأعضاء الجديدة في المزاد المزيد من البدلات.

كيف يقارن النص النهائي مع اقتراح اللجنة الأولي؟

وقد تم الحفاظ على أهداف المناخ والطاقة التي وافق عليها مجلس الربيع الأوروبي لعام 2007، ولا يزال الهيكل العام لاقتراح اللجنة بشأن إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي سليما. بمعنى أنه سيكون هناك سقف واحد على مستوى الاتحاد الأوروبي على عدد بدلات الانبعاثات، وسوف ينخفض ​​هذا الحد سنويا على طول خط اتجاه خطى، والذي سيستمر بعد نهاية فترة التداول الثالثة (2018-2020). والفرق الرئيسي مقارنة بالمقترح هو أن مزاد العلاوات سيتم تدريجيا على نحو أبطأ.

ما هي التغييرات الرئيسية مقارنة باقتراح اللجنة؟

وباختصار، فإن التغييرات الرئيسية التي أدخلت على المقترح هي كما يلي:

ويسمح لبعض الدول الأعضاء بانتقاص اختياري ومؤقت من القاعدة التي تنص على عدم تخصيص أي بدلات مجانا لمولدات الكهرباء اعتبارا من عام 2018. ويتاح هذا الخيار للتقييد للدول الأعضاء التي تستوفي شروطا معينة تتعلق بالترابط بين الكهرباء وحصة وقود أحفوري واحد في إنتاج الكهرباء، ونصيب الفرد من الناتج المحلي الإجمالي بالنسبة لمتوسط ​​الاتحاد الأوروبي 27. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، فإن مقدار البدلات المجانية التي يمكن أن تخصصها دولة عضو لمحطات توليد الطاقة يقتصر على 70 في المائة من انبعاثات ثاني أكسيد الكربون من المصانع ذات الصلة في المرحلة 1 والتراجع في السنوات التالية. وعلاوة على ذلك، لا يمكن تخصيص التخصيص المجاني في المرحلة 3 إلا لمحطات توليد الطاقة التي تعمل أو قيد الإنشاء في موعد لا يتجاوز نهاية عام 2008. انظر الرد على السؤال 15 أدناه. وسيكون هناك مزيد من التفاصيل في التوجيه بشأن المعايير التي ستستخدم لتحديد القطاعات أو القطاعات الفرعية التي تعتبر معرضة لخطر كبير من تسرب الكربون، وتاريخ سابق لنشر قائمة اللجنة لهذه القطاعات (31 كانون الأول / ديسمبر) 2009). وعلاوة على ذلك، تخضع المنشآت في جميع الصناعات المعرضة لبدلات مجانية بنسبة 100 في المائة إلى الحد الذي تستخدم فيه التكنولوجيا الأكثر كفاءة، رهنا بالاستعراض عند التوصل إلى اتفاق دولي مرض. ويقتصر التوزيع الحر للصناعة على حصة انبعاثات هذه الصناعات في إجمالي الانبعاثات في الفترة من عام 2005 إلى عام 2007. وسوف ينخفض ​​مجموع البدلات المخصصة مجانا للمنشآت في قطاعات الصناعة سنويا بما يتماشى مع انخفاض سقف الانبعاثات. كما يجوز للدول الأعضاء أن تعوض منشآت معينة عن تكاليف ثاني أكسيد الكربون التي تم تمريرها في أسعار الكهرباء إذا كانت تكاليف ثاني أكسيد الكربون قد تعرضها لخطر تسرب الكربون. وتعهدت اللجنة بتعديل المبادئ التوجيهية للجماعة بشأن المعونة الحكومية لحماية البيئة في هذا الصدد. انظر الرد على السؤال 15 أدناه. وسيزداد مستوى المزاد العلني للبدلات للصناعات غير المعرضة بطريقة خطية على النحو الذي اقترحته اللجنة، ولكن بدلا من الوصول إلى 100٪ بحلول عام 2020 سيصل إلى 70٪، بهدف الوصول إلى 100٪ بحلول عام 2027. وكما هو متوقع في فإن اقتراح اللجنة، سيعاد توزيع 10 في المائة من البدلات المخصصة للمزاد العلني من الدول الأعضاء ذات الدخل الفردي المرتفع إلى ذوي الدخل الفردي المنخفض من أجل تعزيز القدرة المالية لهذه البلدان على الاستثمار في التكنولوجيات الصديقة للبيئة. وقد أضيفت مخصصات لآلية إعادة توزيع أخرى بنسبة 2 في المائة من البدلات المزاد بالمزاد العلني لتأخذ في الاعتبار الدول الأعضاء التي حققت في عام 2005 انخفاضا بنسبة 20 في المائة على الأقل في انبعاثات غازات الدفيئة مقارنة بالسنة المرجعية التي حددها بروتوكول كيوتو. وتزداد حصة إيرادات المزادات التي توصي الدول الأعضاء باستخدامها لمكافحة تغير المناخ والتكيف معه بشكل رئيسي داخل الاتحاد الأوروبي، ولكن أيضا في البلدان النامية، من 20٪ إلى 50٪. وينص النص على زيادة المستوى المقترح لاستخدام اعتمادات الجماعة الإسلامية / آلية التنمية النظيفة في سيناريو بنسبة 20 في المائة بالنسبة للمشغلين الحاليين الذين حصلوا على أقل الميزانيات لاستيراد واستخدام هذه الائتمانات فيما يتعلق بالمخصصات والوصول إلى الائتمانات في الفترة 2008-2018. وستكون القطاعات الجديدة والداخلين الجدد في الفترتين 2018-2020 و 2008-2018 قادرين أيضا على استخدام الائتمانات. ومع ذلك، فإن المبلغ الإجمالي للائتمانات التي يمكن استخدامها لن يتجاوز 50 في المائة من التخفيض بين عامي 2008 و 2020. واستنادا إلى تخفيض أكثر صرامة للانبعاثات في سياق اتفاق دولي مرض، يمكن للجنة أن تسمح بالوصول الإضافي إلى وحدات خفض الانبعاثات المعتمدة ووحدات خفض الانبعاثات للمشغلين في مخطط الجماعة. انظر الرد على السؤال 20 أدناه. وستستخدم العائدات من مزاد 300 مليون بدالة من احتياطي الوافدين الجدد لدعم ما يصل إلى 12 مشروعا ومشروعا إيضاحيا بشأن احتجاز وتخزين الكربون تبين تكنولوجيات مبتكرة للطاقة المتجددة. وهناك عدد من الشروط المرفقة بآلية التمويل هذه. انظر الرد على السؤال 30 أدناه. وقد تم توسيع إمكانية اختيار منشآت الاحتراق الصغيرة بشرط خضوعها لتدابير مماثلة لتغطي جميع المنشآت الصغيرة بغض النظر عن النشاط، فقد تم رفع عتبة الانبعاثات من 10،000 إلى 25،000 طن من ثاني أكسيد الكربون سنويا، وعتبة القدرة التي منشآت الاحتراق يجب أن تفي بالإضافة قد أثيرت من 25MW إلى 35MW. ومع هذه العتبات المتزايدة، تصبح حصة الانبعاثات المغطاة التي يحتمل استبعادها من نظام الاتجار بالانبعاثات هامة، وبالتالي أضيف حكم يسمح بإجراء تخفيض مناظر في الحد الأقصى للبدلات على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي.

هل ستظل هناك خطط وطنية للتخصيص (نابس)؟

لا، حددت الدول الأعضاء في خطط عملها الوطنية للفترة الأولى (2005-2007) والفترة التجارية الثانية (2008-2018) الكمية الإجمالية للبدلات التي ستصدر - الحد الأقصى - وكيفية تخصيصها للمنشآت المعنية. وقد ولد هذا النهج اختلافات كبيرة في قواعد التخصيص، مما يخلق حافزا لكل دولة عضو على تفضيل صناعتها الخاصة، وأدى إلى تعقيد كبير.

واعتبارا من فترة التداول الثالثة، سيكون هناك سقف واحد على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي وسيتم تخصيص البدلات على أساس القواعد المنسقة. ولذلك لن تكون هناك حاجة إلى خطط تخصيص وطنية.

كيف سيتم تحديد الحد الأقصى للانبعاثات في المرحلة 3؟

وفيما يلي قواعد حساب سقف الاتحاد الأوروبي:

واعتبارا من عام 2018، سينخفض ​​العدد الإجمالي للبدلات سنويا بطريقة خطية. ونقطة البداية في هذا الخط هي متوسط ​​الكمية الإجمالية للبدلات (سقف المرحلة الثانية) الذي ستصدره الدول الأعضاء للفترة 2008-12، وتعديله ليعكس النطاق الواسع للنظام اعتبارا من عام 2018، وكذلك أي منشآت صغيرة عضو وقد اختارت الدول استبعادها. والعامل الخطي الذي ينخفض ​​به المبلغ السنوي هو 1.74٪ بالنسبة إلى غطاء المرحلة 2.

ونقطة الانطلاق لتحديد العامل الخطي 1.74٪ هي التخفيض العام بنسبة 20٪ لغازات الدفيئة مقارنة بعام 1990، وهو ما يعادل انخفاضا بنسبة 14٪ مقارنة بعام 2005. ومع ذلك، يلزم تخفيض أكبر في إتس للاتحاد الأوروبي لأنه أرخص لخفض الانبعاثات في قطاعات إتس. وتقسم الشعبة التي تقلل من تكلفة التخفيض الإجمالية إلى ما يلي:

انخفاض بنسبة 21٪ في انبعاثات قطاع إتس في الاتحاد الأوروبي مقارنة بعام 2005 بحلول عام 2020؛ وهو ما يمثل انخفاضا بنحو 10٪ مقارنة بعام 2005 بالنسبة للقطاعات التي لا تغطيها إتس الاتحاد الأوروبي.

ويؤدي التخفيض بنسبة 21 في المائة في عام 2020 إلى الحد الأقصى لمعاهدة التعاون التقني في عام 2020 بحد أقصى قدره 1720 مليونا من البدلات، وهو ما يعني أن متوسط ​​الحد الأقصى للمرحلة الثالثة (2018 إلى 2020) يبلغ نحو 1846 مليون بدل وخفض 11 في المائة بالمقارنة مع سقف المرحلة الثانية.

وتتوافق جميع الأرقام المطلقة مع التغطية في بداية فترة التداول الثانية، وبالتالي لا تأخذ في الحسبان الطيران، والتي ستضاف في عام 2018، والقطاعات الأخرى التي ستضاف في المرحلة 3.

وستحدد اللجنة الأرقام النهائية لأرقام الانبعاثات السنوية في المرحلة 3 وتنشرها بحلول 30 أيلول / سبتمبر 2018.

كيف سيتم تحديد الحد الأقصى للانبعاثات بعد المرحلة 3؟

وسيستمر تطبيق العامل الخطي بنسبة 1.74٪ لتحديد سقف المرحلة 3 بعد نهاية فترة التداول في عام 2020، وسيحدد الحد الأقصى لفترة التداول الرابعة (2021 إلى 2028) وما بعدها. ويمكن تعديله بحلول عام 2025 على أبعد تقدير. في الواقع، سيكون من الضروري تخفيضات كبيرة في الانبعاثات بنسبة 60٪ -80٪ ​​مقارنة بعام 1990 بحلول عام 2050 للوصول إلى الهدف الاستراتيجي المتمثل في الحد من الزيادة العالمية في درجات الحرارة إلى ما لا يزيد عن 2 درجة مئوية فوق مستويات ما قبل الثورة الصناعية.

وسيتم تحديد سقف على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي لبدلات الانبعاثات لكل سنة على حدة. هل سيؤدي ذلك إلى تقليل المرونة للمنشآت المعنية؟

لا، لن يتم تخفيض المرونة للمنشآت على الإطلاق. وفي أي سنة، يتعين على السلطات المختصة أن تصدر العلاوات المزمع مزادها وتوزيعها بحلول 28 شباط / فبراير. وآخر موعد لتقديم بدلات الاسترداد هو 30 نيسان / أبريل من السنة التالية للسنة التي حدثت فيها الانبعاثات. لذلك يحصل المشغلون على بدلات للسنة الحالية قبل أن يضطروا إلى تقديم بدلات لتغطية انبعاثاتهم للسنة السابقة. وتبقى العلاوات سارية طوال فرتة التداول، وميكن اآلن "أن تكون" املخصصات الفائضة "مصرفية" الستخدامها يف فرتات املتاجرة الالحقة. وفي هذا الصدد لن يتغير شيء.

وسيبقى النظام قائما على فترات التداول، ولكن فترة التداول الثالثة ستستمر ثماني سنوات، من 2018 إلى 2020، مقابل خمس سنوات للمرحلة الثانية من 2008 إلى 2018.

وبالنسبة لفترة التداول الثانية، قررت الدول الأعضاء عموما تخصيص كميات متساوية من البدلات لكل سنة. وسيتطابق الانخفاض الخطي كل سنة اعتبارا من 2018 مع اتجاهات الانبعاثات المتوقعة على نحو أفضل خلال هذه الفترة.

ما هي الأرقام السنوية المؤقتة لرسوم إتس للفترة 2018-2018؟

فيما يلي أرقام رأس المال السنوية المبدئية:

وتستند هذه الأرقام إلى نطاق إتس كما هو مطبق في المرحلة 2 (2008 إلى 2018)، وقرارات اللجنة بشأن خطط التخصيص الوطنية للمرحلة الثانية، التي تبلغ 2083 مليون طن. وسيتم تعديل هذه الأرقام لعدة أسباب. أولا، سيجري تعديل لمراعاة تمديدات النطاق في المرحلة 2، شريطة أن تثبت الدول الأعضاء انبعاثاتها الناشئة عن هذه التمديدات والتحقق منها. وثانيا، سيجري تعديل فيما يتعلق بمزيد من التمديدات لنطاق معاهدة التجارة الأوروبية في فترة التداول الثالثة. وثالثا، فإن أي تعطيل للمنشآت الصغيرة سيؤدي إلى تخفيض مماثل في الحد الأقصى. رابعا، لا تأخذ الأرقام في الحسبان إدراج الطيران، ولا الانبعاثات من النرويج وأيسلندا وليختنشتاين.

هل ستخصص المخصصات مجانا؟

نعم فعلا. وستحصل المنشآت الصناعية على تخصيص مجاني انتقالي. وفي الدول الأعضاء المؤهلة للانتقاص الاختياري، يجوز لمحطات توليد الطاقة أيضا، إذا ما قررت الدولة العضو ذلك، الحصول على بدلات مجانية. وتشير التقديرات إلى أن نصف البدلات المتاحة على الأقل بحلول عام 2018 سيجري بيعها بالمزاد العلني.

وفي حين أن الغالبية العظمى من البدلات قد خصصت مجانا للمنشآت في فترتي التداول الأولى والثانية، اقترحت اللجنة أن يصبح المزاد العلني للمخصصات المبدأ الأساسي للتخصيص. ويرجع ذلك إلى أن المزاد يضمن على نحو أفضل كفاءة وشفافية وبساطة النظام ويخلق أكبر حافز للاستثمار في اقتصاد منخفض الكربون. أفضل ما يتماشى مع "مبدأ الملوث يدفع" ويتجنب إعطاء أرباح غير متوقعة لبعض القطاعات التي مرت على التكلفة الافتراضية للبدلات لعملائها على الرغم من الحصول عليها مجانا.

كيف سيتم توزيع البدلات مجانا؟

وبحلول 31 كانون الأول / ديسمبر 2018، ستعتمد اللجنة قواعد على نطاق الاتحاد الأوروبي، ستوضع في إطار إجراء للجنة ("كوميتولوغي"). وهذه القواعد سوف تنسق تماما المخصصات، وبالتالي فإن جميع الشركات في جميع أنحاء الاتحاد الأوروبي مع نفس الأنشطة أو ما شابهها سوف تخضع لنفس القواعد. وستكفل القواعد إلى أقصى حد ممكن أن يخصص التخصيص تكنولوجيات تتسم بالكفاءة في استخدام الكربون. وتنص القواعد المعتمدة على أنه ينبغي، قدر الإمكان، أن تستند المخصصات إلى ما يسمى بالمعايير المرجعية، عدد من البدلات لكل كمية من الإنتاج التاريخي. وتكافئ هذه القواعد المشغلين الذين اتخذوا إجراءات مبكرة للحد من غازات الدفيئة، ويعكسون على نحو أفضل مبدأ الملوث يدفعون، ويعطيون حوافز أقوى لخفض الانبعاثات، لأن المخصصات لن تعتمد على الانبعاثات التاريخية. وتحدد جميع المخصصات قبل بداية فترة التداول الثالثة ولن يسمح بأي تسويات لاحقة.

أي المنشآت سوف تتلقى مخصصات مجانية والتي لن؟ كيف يمكن تفادي الآثار السلبية على القدرة التنافسية؟

مع الأخذ في الاعتبار قدرتها على تمرير زيادة تكلفة بدلات الانبعاثات، المزاد الكامل هو القاعدة اعتبارا من 2018 فصاعدا لمولدات الكهرباء. ومع ذلك، فإن الدول الأعضاء التي تستوفي شروطا معينة تتعلق بترابطها أو نصيبها من الوقود الأحفوري في إنتاج الكهرباء والناتج المحلي الإجمالي للفرد بالنسبة لمتوسط ​​الاتحاد الأوروبي 27، لديها خيار التحيد مؤقتا عن هذه القاعدة فيما يتعلق بمحطات الطاقة القائمة. ويتعين أن يكون معدل المزاد في عام 2018 على الأقل 30 في المائة فيما يتعلق بالانبعاثات في الفترة الأولى، وأن يزيد تدريجيا إلى 100 في المائة في موعد أقصاه عام 2020. وإذا طبق الخيار، يتعين على الدولة العضو أن تتعهد بالاستثمار في تحسين ورفع مستوى البنية التحتية، والتقنيات النظيفة، وتنويع مزيج الطاقة ومصادر الإمداد، وذلك بقدر ما يعادل القيمة السوقية للتخصيص الحر.

In other sectors, allocations for free will be phased out progressively from 2018, with Member States agreeing to start at 20% auctioning in 2018, increasing to 70% auctioning in 2020 with a view to reaching 100% in 2027. However, an exception will be made for installations in sectors that are found to be exposed to a significant risk of 'carbon leakage'. This risk could occur if the EU ETS increased production costs so much that companies decided to relocate production to areas outside the EU that are not subject to comparable emission constraints. The Commission will determine the sectors concerned by 31 December 2009. To do this, the Commission will assess inter alia whether the direct and indirect additional production costs induced by the implementation of the ETS Directive as a proportion of gross value added exceed 5% and whether the total value of its exports and imports divided by the total value of its turnover and imports exceeds 10%. If the result for either of these criteria exceeds 30%, the sector would also be considered to be exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. Installations in these sectors would receive 100% of their share in the annually declining total quantity of allowances for free. The share of these industries' emissions is determined in relation to total ETS emissions in 2005 to 2007.

CO 2 costs passed on in electricity prices could also expose certain installations to the risk of carbon leakage. In order to avoid such risk, Member States may grant a compensation with respect to such costs. In the absence of an international agreement on climate change, the Commission has undertaken to modify the Community guidelines on state aid for environmental protection in this respect.

Under an international agreement which ensures that competitors in other parts of the world bear a comparable cost, the risk of carbon leakage may well be negligible. Therefore, by 30 June 2018, the Commission will carry out an in-depth assessment of the situation of energy-intensive industry and the risk of carbon leakage, in the light of the outcome of the international negotiations and also taking into account any binding sectoral agreements that may have been concluded. The report will be accompanied by any proposals considered appropriate. These could potentially include maintaining or adjusting the proportion of allowances received free of charge to industrial installations that are particularly exposed to global competition or including importers of the products concerned in the ETS.

Who will organise the auctions and how will they be carried out?

Member States will be responsible for ensuring that the allowances given to them are auctioned. Each Member State has to decide whether it wants to develop its own auctioning infrastructure and platform or whether it wants to cooperate with other Member States to develop regional or EU-wide solutions. The distribution of the auctioning rights to Member States is largely based on emissions in phase 1 of the EU ETS, but a part of the rights will be redistributed from richer Member States to poorer ones to take account of the lower GDP per head and higher prospects for growth and emissions among the latter. It is still the case that 10% of the rights to auction allowances will be redistributed from Member States with high per capita income to those with low per capita income in order to strengthen the financial capacity of the latter to invest in climate friendly technologies. However, a provision has been added for another redistributive mechanism of 2% to take into account Member States which in 2005 had achieved a reduction of at least 20% in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the reference year set by the Kyoto Protocol. Nine Member States benefit from this provision.

Any auctioning must respect the rules of the internal market and must therefore be open to any potential buyer under non-discriminatory conditions. By 30 June 2018, the Commission will adopt a Regulation (through the comitology procedure) that will provide the appropriate rules and conditions for ensuring efficient, coordinated auctions without disturbing the allowance market.

How many allowances will each Member State auction and how is this amount determined?

All allowances which are not allocated free of charge will be auctioned. A total of 88% of allowances to be auctioned by each Member State is distributed on the basis of the Member State's share of historic emissions under the EU ETS. For purposes of solidarity and growth, 12% of the total quantity is distributed in a way that takes into account GDP per capita and the achievements under the Kyoto-Protocol.

Which sectors and gases are covered as of 2018?

The ETS covers installations performing specified activities. Since the start it has covered, above certain capacity thresholds, power stations and other combustion plants, oil refineries, coke ovens, iron and steel plants and factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and board. As for greenhouse gases, it currently only covers carbon dioxide emissions, with the exception of the Netherlands, which has opted in emissions from nitrous oxide.

As from 2018, the scope of the ETS will be extended to also include other sectors and greenhouse gases. CO 2 emissions from petrochemicals, ammonia and aluminium will be included, as will N2O emissions from the production of nitric, adipic and glyocalic acid production and perfluorocarbons from the aluminium sector. The capture, transport and geological storage of all greenhouse gas emissions will also be covered. These sectors will receive allowances free of charge according to EU-wide rules, in the same way as other industrial sectors already covered.

As of 2018, aviation will also be included in the EU ETS.

Will small installations be excluded from the scope?

A large number of installations emitting relatively low amounts of CO 2 are currently covered by the ETS and concerns have been raised over the cost-effectiveness of their inclusion. As from 2018, Member States will be allowed to remove these installations from the ETS under certain conditions. The installations concerned are those whose reported emissions were lower than 25 000 tonnes of CO 2 equivalent in each of the 3 years preceding the year of application. For combustion installations, an additional capacity threshold of 35MW applies. In addition Member States are given the possibility to exclude installations operated by hospitals. The installations may be excluded from the ETS only if they will be covered by measures that will achieve an equivalent contribution to emission reductions.

How many emission credits from third countries will be allowed?

For the second trading period, Member States allowed their operators to use significant quantities of credits generated by emission-saving projects undertaken in third countries to cover part of their emissions in the same way as they use ETS allowances. The revised Directive extends the rights to use these credits for the third trading period and allows a limited additional quantity to be used in such a way that the overall use of credits is limited to 50% of the EU-wide reductions over the period 2008-2020. For existing installations, and excluding new sectors within the scope, this will represent a total level of access of approximately 1.6 billion credits over the period 2008-2020. In practice, this means that existing operators will be able to use credits up to a minimum of 11% of their allocation during the period 2008-2018, while a top-up is foreseen for operators with the lowest sum of free allocation and allowed use of credits in the 2008-2018 period. New sectors and new entrants in the third trading period will have a guaranteed minimum access of 4.5% of their verified emissions during the period 2018-2020. For the aviation sector, the minimum access will be 1.5%. The precise percentages will be determined through comitology.

These projects must be officially recognised under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism (covering projects carried out in countries with an emissions reduction target under the Protocol) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) (for projects undertaken in developing countries). Credits from JI projects are known as Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) while those from CDM projects are called Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).

On the quality side only credits from project types eligible for use in the EU trading scheme during the period 2008-2018 will be accepted in the period 2018-2020. Furthermore, from 1 January 2018 measures may be applied to restrict the use of specific credits from project types. Such a quality control mechanism is needed to assure the environmental and economic integrity of future project types.

To create greater flexibility, and in the absence of an international agreement being concluded by 31 December 2009, credits could be used in accordance with agreements concluded with third countries. The use of these credits should however not increase the overall number beyond 50% of the required reductions. Such agreements would not be required for new projects that started from 2018 onwards in Least Developed Countries.

Based on a stricter emissions reduction in the context of a satisfactory international agreement , additional access to credits could be allowed, as well as the use of additional types of project credits or other mechanisms created under the international agreement. However, once an international agreement has been reached, from January 2018 onwards only credits from projects in third countries that have ratified the agreement or from additional types of project approved by the Commission will be eligible for use in the Community scheme.

Will it be possible to use credits from carbon ‘sinks’ like forests?

No. Before making its proposal, the Commission analysed the possibility of allowing credits from certain types of land use, land-use change and forestry (‘LULUCF’) projects which absorb carbon from the atmosphere. It concluded that doing so could undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS, for the following reasons:

LULUCF projects cannot physically deliver permanent emissions reductions. Insufficient solutions have been developed to deal with the uncertainties, non-permanence of carbon storage and potential emissions 'leakage' problems arising from such projects. The temporary and reversible nature of such activities would pose considerable risks in a company-based trading system and impose great liability risks on Member States. The inclusion of LULUCF projects in the ETS would require a quality of monitoring and reporting comparable to the monitoring and reporting of emissions from installations currently covered by the system. This is not available at present and is likely to incur costs which would substantially reduce the attractiveness of including such projects. The simplicity, transparency and predictability of the ETS would be considerably reduced. Moreover, the sheer quantity of potential credits entering the system could undermine the functioning of the carbon market unless their role were limited, in which case their potential benefits would become marginal.

The Commission, the Council and the European Parliament believe that global deforestation can be better addressed through other instruments. For example, using part of the proceeds from auctioning allowances in the EU ETS could generate additional means to invest in LULUCF activities both inside and outside the EU, and may provide a model for future expansion. In this respect the Commission has proposed to set up the Global Forest Carbon Mechanism that would be a performance-based system for financing reductions in deforestation levels in developing countries.

Besides those already mentioned, are there other credits that could be used in the revised ETS?

نعم فعلا. Projects in EU Member States which reduce greenhouse gas emissions not covered by the ETS could issue credits. These Community projects would need to be managed according to common EU provisions set up by the Commission in order to be tradable throughout the system. Such provisions would be adopted only for projects that cannot be realised through inclusion in the ETS. The provisions will seek to ensure that credits from Community projects do not result in double-counting of emission reductions nor impede other policy measures to reduce emissions not covered by the ETS, and that they are based on simple, easily administered rules.

Are there measures in place to ensure that the price of allowances won't fall sharply during the third trading period?

A stable and predictable regulatory framework is vital for market stability. The revised Directive makes the regulatory framework as predictable as possible in order to boost stability and rule out policy-induced volatility. Important elements in this respect are the determination of the cap on emissions in the Directive well in advance of the start of the trading period, a linear reduction factor for the cap on emissions which continues to apply also beyond 2020 and the extension of the trading period from 5 to 8 years. The sharp fall in the allowance price during the first trading period was due to over-allocation of allowances which could not be “banked” for use in the second trading period. For the second and subsequent trading periods, Member States are obliged to allow the banking of allowances from one period to the next and therefore the end of one trading period is not expected to have any impact on the price.

A new provision will apply as of 2018 in case of excessive price fluctuations in the allowance market. If, for more than six consecutive months, the allowance price is more than three times the average price of allowances during the two preceding years on the European market, the Commission will convene a meeting with Member States. If it is found that the price evolution does not correspond to market fundamentals, the Commission may either allow Member States to bring forward the auctioning of a part of the quantity to be auctioned, or allow them to auction up to 25% of the remaining allowances in the new entrant reserve.

The price of allowances is determined by supply and demand and reflects fundamental factors like economic growth, fuel prices, rainfall and wind (availability of renewable energy) and temperature (demand for heating and cooling) etc. A degree of uncertainty is inevitable for such factors. The markets, however, allow participants to hedge the risks that may result from changes in allowances prices.

Are there any provisions for linking the EU ETS to other emissions trading systems?

نعم فعلا. One of the key means to reduce emissions more cost-effectively is to enhance and further develop the global carbon market. The Commission sees the EU ETS as an important building block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems. Linking other national or regional cap-and-trade emissions trading systems to the EU ETS can create a bigger market, potentially lowering the aggregate cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The increased liquidity and reduced price volatility that this would entail would improve the functioning of markets for emission allowances. This may lead to a global network of trading systems in which participants, including legal entities, can buy emission allowances to fulfil their respective reduction commitments.

The EU is keen to work with the new US Administration to build a transatlantic and indeed global carbon market to act as the motor of a concerted international push to combat climate change.

While the original Directive allows for linking the EU ETS with other industrialised countries that have ratified the Kyoto Protocol, the new rules allow for linking with any country or administrative entity (such as a state or group of states under a federal system) which has established a compatible mandatory cap-and-trade system whose design elements would not undermine the environmental integrity of the EU ETS. Where such systems cap absolute emissions, there would be mutual recognition of allowances issued by them and the EU ETS.

What is a Community registry and how does it work?

Registries are standardised electronic databases ensuring the accurate accounting of the issuance, holding, transfer and cancellation of emission allowances. As a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in its own right, the Community is also obliged to maintain a registry. This is the Community Registry, which is distinct from the registries of Member States. Allowances issued from 1 January 2018 onwards will be held in the Community registry instead of in national registries.

Will there be any changes to monitoring, reporting and verification requirements?

The Commission will adopt a new Regulation (through the comitology procedure) by 31 December 2018 governing the monitoring and reporting of emissions from the activities listed in Annex I of the Directive. A separate Regulation on the verification of emission reports and the accreditation of verifiers should specify conditions for accreditation, mutual recognition and cancellation of accreditation for verifiers, and for supervision and peer review as appropriate.

What provision will be made for new entrants into the market?

Five percent of the total quantity of allowances will be put into a reserve for new installations or airlines that enter the system after 2018 (“new entrants”). The allocations from this reserve should mirror the allocations to corresponding existing installations.

A part of the new entrant reserve, amounting to 300 million allowances, will be made available to support the investments in up to 12 demonstration projects using the carbon capture and storage technology and demonstration projects using innovative renewable energy technologies. There should be a fair geographical distribution of the projects.

In principle, any allowances remaining in the reserve shall be distributed to Member States for auctioning. The distribution key shall take into account the level to which installations in Member States have benefited from this reserve.

What has been agreed with respect to the financing of the 12 carbon capture and storage demonstration projects requested by a previous European Council?

The European Parliament's Environment Committee tabled an amendment to the EU ETS Directive requiring allowances in the new entrant reserve to be set aside in order to co-finance up to 12 demonstration projects as requested by the European Council in spring 2007. This amendment has later been extended to include also innovative renewable energy technologies that are not commercially viable yet. Projects shall be selected on the basis of objective and transparent criteria that include requirements for knowledge sharing. Support shall be given from the proceeds of these allowances via Member States and shall be complementary to substantial co-financing by the operator of the installation. No project shall receive support via this mechanism that exceeds 15% of the total number of allowances (i. e. 45 million allowances) available for this purpose. The Member State may choose to co-finance the project as well, but will in any case transfer the market value of the attributed allowances to the operator, who will not receive any allowances.

A total of 300 million allowances will therefore be set aside until 2018 for this purpose.

What is the role of an international agreement and its potential impact on EU ETS?

When an international agreement is reached, the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the nature of the measures agreed upon in the international agreement and their implications, in particular with respect to the risk of carbon leakage. On the basis of this report, the Commission shall then adopt a legislative proposal amending the present Directive as appropriate.

For the effects on the use of credits from Joint Implementation and Clean Development Mechanism projects, please see the reply to question 20.

ما هي الخطوات التالية؟

Member States have to bring into force the legal instruments necessary to comply with certain provisions of the revised Directive by 31 December 2009. This concerns the collection of duly substantiated and verified emissions data from installations that will only be covered by the EU ETS as from 2018, and the national lists of installations and the allocation to each one. For the remaining provisions, the national laws, regulations and administrative provisions only have to be ready by 31 December 2018.

The Commission has already started the work on implementation. For example, the collection and analysis of data for use in relation to carbon leakage is ongoing (list of sectors due end 2009). Work is also ongoing to prepare the Regulation on timing, administration and other aspects of auctioning (due by June 2018), the harmonised allocation rules (due end 2018) and the two Regulations on monitoring and reporting of emissions and verification of emissions and accreditation of verifiers (due end 2018).

European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) data from EUTL.

European data.

EU ETS data download.

[+] Show table definition ( records: 44509 )

ETS_Database_v25.zip (ZIP archive)

معلومة اضافية.

EU ETS data viewer - manual.

EU ETS data viewer - manual (PDF document)

EU ETS Background note.

Translation of activity codes (Microsoft Excel (Office 2018))

This data set is mainly based on data extracted from the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) on 17 May 2017. The EUTL checks and records all transactions taking place within the trading system.

It is run by the European Commission. See: ec. europa. eu/environment/ets. The data set also includes information on auctions of allowances, compiled from auctioning platforms, as well as EEA estimates of ETS emissions for the period 2005 to 2018, to reflect the current scope of the ETS for the third trading period (2018–2020). See more information in the manual.

معلومة اضافية.

The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) is a central instrument of the EU's policy to fight climate change and achieve cost-efficient reductions of greenhouse gas emissions. It is the world's biggest carbon market.

المحتوى ذو الصلة.

Data visualisations.

Produced Indicators.

الإحاطات ذات الصلة.

منشورات ذات صلة.

Visualisations produced.

روابط ثابتة.

طريقة قديمة.

إجراءات المستند.

شارك مع الآخرين.

PDF generated on 02 Jan 2018, 03:32 AM.

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نستخدم ملفات تعريف الارتباط لتسجيل بعض إعدادات التفضيلات وتحليل كيفية استخدام الزوار لموقعنا على الويب. لا تحتوي ملفات تعريف الارتباط على أي معلومات شخصية عنك. إذا كنت ترغب في ذلك، راجع كيفية حذف / تعطيل ملفات تعريف الارتباط في متصفح الويب الخاص بك ولكن بعد ذلك قد لا يعمل موقعنا بشكل صحيح. انظر أيضا سياسة الخصوصية.

EU Emissions Trading System: landmark agreement between Parliament and Council delivers on EU's commitment to turn Paris Agreement into reality.

Brussels, 9 November 2017.

The European Parliament and Council have today reached a provisional agreement to revise the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) for the period after 2020. This revision will contribute to put the EU on track to achieving a significant part of its commitment under the Paris Agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030.

Today's deal between Parliament and Council provides a clear outcome after more than two years of intensive negotiations, following the Commission's proposal to revise the EU ETS in July 2018.

Welcoming the political agreement, Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete said: " Today's landmark deal demonstrates that the European Union is turning its Paris commitment and ambition into concrete action. By putting in place the necessary legislation to strengthen the EU Emissions Trading System and deliver on our climate objectives, Europe is once again leading the way in the fight against climate change. This legislation will make the European carbon-emissions market fit for purpose. I welcome in particular the robust carbon leakage regime that has been agreed and the measures further strengthening the Market Stability Reserve."

The EU Emissions Trading Scheme puts a cap on the carbon dioxide (CO2) emitted by more than 11,000 installations in the power sector and energy intensive industry through a market-based cap and trade system.

Building on the Commission's proposal, the main improvements agreed by Parliament and Council include:

Significant changes to the system in order to speed up emissions reductions and strengthen the Market Stability Reserve to speed up the reduction of the current oversupply of allowances on the carbon market; Additional safeguards to provide European industry with extra protection, if needed, against the risk of carbon leakage; Several support mechanisms to help the industry and the power sectors meet the innovation and investment challenges of the transition to a low-carbon economy.

Following the political agreement (a 'trilogue' negotiation between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission), the text will have to be formally approved by the European Parliament and the Council. Once endorsed by both co-legislators, the revised EU ETS Directive will be published in the Official Journal of the Union and enters into force 20 days after publication.

The EU tackles growing aviation emissions.

Brussels, 3 February 2017.

The Commission is amending the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) making it fit for tackling CO2 emissions from aviation. This comes following an agreement by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to stabilise international aviation emissions.

The European Union is a leading advocate for addressing fast-growing emissions from aviation. At the 2018 ICAO Assembly, the European Union and its Member States played an instrumental role in securing a deal on a global market-based measure to stabilise international aviation emissions. The system will require airlines to monitor and report their annual CO 2 emissions on international routes and offset those exceeding 2020 levels.

Following this deal at global level, a revision of the EU Emissions Trading System is needed to maintain the contribution of the aviation sector to the European climate objectives and for the smooth implementation of the ICAO Global Market-Based Measure. The Commission is proposing to continue with the current geographic scope of the EU Emissions Trading System for aviation, covering flights between airports in the European Economic Area. This will ensure a level playing field and equal treatment of all airlines flying in Europe.

Commissioner for Climate Action and Energy Miguel Arias Cañete said: " With this proposal we are making sure that the aviation sector also contributes to our climate objectives. Now, we call on countries around the world to participate in the global scheme from the beginning and help us finalise and implement sound environmental criteria to deliver real emissions reductions in the aviation sector ."

Commissioner for Transport Violeta Bulc said: " Following ICAO's landmark agreement, the European Union is now focused on getting the global scheme up and running. We are serious about achieving carbon neutral growth for aviation, and we will provide technical and financial assistance to make it happen. Aviation is a global business and no country can be left behind!"

Today's proposal to revise the EU Emission Trading System will be discussed by the European Parliament and the Council, which are expected to finalise the co-decision process by the end of the year.

The future competitiveness of the European air transport sector and its environmental sustainability go hand-in-hand. One of the objectives of the Aviation Strategy for Europe adopted by the Commission in December 2018 is therefore to preserve and enhance high environmental standards.

Between 2018 and 2018, commercial airlines covered by the EU Emissions Trading System contributed to more than 65 million tonnes of CO₂ emission reductions. These reductions have taken place either within the sector or in other sectors of the economy. The levels of compliance are above 99.5% of covered emissions.

The detailed rules of the Global Market-Based Measure will be prepared in 2017 and endorsed by ICAO in the course of 2018. The Commission is contributing to this process, and will provide technical assistance where needed. Even if the scheme only starts from 2021, emissions data should be collected from 2019.

Once there is greater clarity on the implementation of the Global Market-Based Measure, the Commission intends to present a further assessment of the EU Emission Trading System and, as appropriate, make the necessary proposals to make the scheme operational. This will also take due account of the EU's commitment to reduce domestic economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% by 2030 compared to 1990 levels.

Questions and Answers: Reducing emissions from aviation.

Fact sheet: 39th Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years and Counting.

A. Denny Ellerman, Claudio Marcantonini, Aleksandar Zaklan; The European Union Emissions Trading System: Ten Years and Counting, Review of Environmental Economics and Policy , Volume 10, Issue 1, 1 January 2018, Pages 89–107, doi/10.1093/reep/rev014.

تنزيل ملف الاقتباس:

& # 169؛ 2018 مطبعة جامعة أكسفورد.

This article provides an introduction to the European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS). First we describe the legislative development of the EU ETS, its evolution from free allocation to auctioning and centralized allocation rules, its relationship to the Kyoto Protocol and other trading systems, and its relationship to other EU climate and energy policies. This is followed by an assessment of the performance of the EU ETS, which focuses in particular on emissions, allowance prices, and the use of offsets. We conclude with a discussion of the current debate about the future of the EU ETS and proposals for changes to both the EU ETS and the climate policy environment in which it operates. ( JEL : Q54, Q58)

المقدمة.

The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the world’s largest cap-and-trade program and arguably the most important market-based application of economic principles to the climate problem. From its inception, the EU ETS has drawn attention and been the subject of vigorous debate in the public arena. In fact, in 2007, it was the topic of the symposium in the inaugural issue of this journal. The articles in that symposium discussed the unusually decentralized nature of the EU ETS ( Kruger, Oates, and Pizer 2007 ) and provided an initial assessment of its performance during its first two years ( Convery and Redmond 2007 ; Ellerman and Buchner 2007 ). In 2018, the EU ETS started its eleventh year, having completed its second phase (2008–2018) and begun its third phase (2018–2020) under an EU-wide cap on emissions that is declining indefinitely at an annual rate of 1.74 percent.

The objective of this journal’s second symposium on the EU ETS is to review and evaluate the literature on the EU ETS (as of 2017), to draw some conclusions about the performance of the EU ETS, and to suggest a research agenda to address unresolved issues. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the EU ETS to serve as background for the topics discussed in the other two articles. In the first article, Hintermann, Peterson, and Rickels (2018) examine market and price behavior in the EU ETS. The second article, by Martin, Muûls, and Wagner (2018) , addresses the effect of the EU ETS on the behavior of regulated firms with respect to abatement, competitiveness, and innovation.

The remainder of this article consists of three sections. The first section describes the history and structure of the EU ETS. The second section reviews the performance of the EU ETS over its first ten years, focusing on emissions, allowance prices, and the use of offsets. 1 The final section discusses the continuing debate about the design of the EU ETS and the recently adopted and proposed changes to that design.

History and Structure of the EU ETS.

The EU ETS is a classic cap-and-trade system. 2 As of 2017, the EU ETS covered approximately 13,500 stationary installations in the electric utility and major industrial sectors and all domestic airline emissions in the EU’s twenty-eight member states, plus three members of the closely associated European Economic Area: Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein. Approximately two billion tons of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) and some other greenhouse gases (GHGs) are included in the system, together accounting for about 4 percent of global GHG emissions in 2017 ( Olivier et al. 2017 ). Aside from its sheer size in terms of geographic scope, number of included sources, and value of allowances, another distinguishing feature of the EU ETS is its implementation through a multinational framework, namely the EU, rather than through the action of a single state or national government, as assumed in most theory and as has been the case for most other cap-and-trade systems. 3 We turn now to the process by which this multinational system was adopted.

Legislative Development.

The first clear signal that the EU might implement an emissions trading system was in 2000, when the European Commission issued the Green Paper on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading within the European Union ( European Commission 2000 ). This paper discussed whether the EU should implement an EU-wide cap-and-trade system to limit GHG emissions (initially CO 2 ) to complement other policies and measures, chiefly concerning energy efficiency and renewable energy, implemented primarily at the member-state level. Such a cap-and-trade system was also viewed as a means to ensure achievement of the targets to which the EU and its member states had committed in the Kyoto Protocol (KP). The green paper laid out the essential features of the system that would become the EU ETS: a trial period to run from 2005 through 2007, followed by full implementation over the 5-year period corresponding to the First Commitment Period of the KP (2008–2018). Following extensive debate, the ETS Directive was unanimously adopted by the European Council of Member States in October 2003 ( OJEU 2003 ). And, as initially proposed in the green paper, the EU ETS went into effect on January 1, 2005, 15 months later.

In October 2004, the ETS Directive was amended by the Linking Directive ( OJEU 2004 ), which allowed the owners of affected facilities to substitute a yet-to-be-specified number of offsets (i. e., credits from the KP’s Clean Development Mechanism [CDM] and Joint Implementation [JI]) to fulfill their obligation to submit EU allowances (EUAs) equal to their annual emissions.

In keeping with the spirit of an initial trial period, the ETS Directive called for the European Commission to review the first years of experience and to propose appropriate changes to the ETS. This review led to the adoption of significant revisions to the EU ETS in late 2008 ( OJEU 2009b ), which would govern the system from 2018 on. The most important changes in this Amended Directive were the following: The significance of the single EU-wide cap can only be appreciated by recognizing the considerable decentralization of cap-setting and allocation of allowances that existed under the initial ETS Directive.

adoption of a single EU-wide cap declining at 1.74 percent per annum;

adoption of auctioning as the basic allocation principle, to be fully applied to the electric utility sector in 2018 and to be phased in by 2027 for the remaining industrial sectors;

continued free allocation for industrial facilities according to centrally determined benchmarks during the transition to full auctioning; و.

changes in offset provisions that further limited their use while expanding the scope for linking with GHG cap-and-trade systems that might develop in other parts of the world. 4.

Evolution from a Highly Decentralized Structure to an EU-Wide Cap.

In its early years, the EU ETS can be best understood as a system for the mandatory linking of twenty-five member-state systems, each of which set its own cap and determined the distribution of allowances to affected facilities, subject to a 90-day review by the European Commission. More specifically, each member state developed a National Allocation Plan (NAP) stating the total number of allowances to be created and how they would be allocated to affected installations in the member state. These NAPs would go into effect unless the commission rejected the NAP because it failed to comply with certain criteria in the ETS Directive. In effect, the EU-wide cap was the sum of the member-state caps, and it would not be known definitively until the last NAP had been reviewed and not rejected. 5.

The NAP process proved to be long, laborious, and unrewarding for all concerned. In both the 2005–2007 and 2008–2018 periods, the commission rejected many NAP submissions, and several member states subsequently challenged these rulings before the European Court of First Instance. 6 It was not until 18 months into phase I that the last NAP cleared the commission’s review. The second NAP cycle started at this time, 18 months before the start of 2008, but member states were often late in submitting, and the final NAP to clear review without being rejected did so 1 month before the start of phase II. A year later, the member states agreed unanimously to abandon the NAP process and instead to adopt a system-wide cap to take effect in 2018. The single cap required a new set of principles for distributing allowances, which we explain next.

Auctioning and Centralized Allocation Rules.

The two greatest criticisms of the first phase were the “windfall profits” from free allocation and the alleged competitive distortions resulting from different member-state rules for allocation. Despite strong arguments in the European Parliament for significant auctioning of allowances, the directive finally agreed upon in 2003 required that at least 95 percent of allowances be allocated freely in the first phase and 90 percent in the second phase. In effect, decentralized free allocation was the political price for ensuring the participation of all member states in this multinational trading system. 7 Auctioning addressed both criticisms of the NAP process in one fell swoop. That is, windfall profits would be eliminated, as would the possibility of competitive distortions within the single EU market. However, auctioning would be phased in, which meant that EU-wide, sector-specific standards would have to be developed to avoid distortions from the remaining free allocation.

The timing by which auctioning would be introduced and free allocation phased out varied according to sector, perceived loss of competitiveness in international (non-EU) trade, and when the member state joined the EU. For example, free allocation ended abruptly in 2018 for the electric utility sector, which accounts for about 50 percent of EU ETS emissions ( Trotignon and Delbosc 2008 , p. 23) and was deemed not to face any competitive threat internationally. Some exceptions were allowed for coal-dependent new member states in Eastern Europe, which have more time to phase out free allocation, provided that they make investments in the modernization of the electricity sector.

The nonelectric industrial sectors, which face varying levels of non-EU competitive pressures, were allowed a more gradual phase out of free allocation beginning in 2018. Allocations to affected facilities were to follow EU-wide sector standards—called benchmarks—to be developed during phase II. For these industrial facilities, free allocation would start at 80 percent of the full benchmark in 2018, be reduced to 30 percent by 2020, and then phased out completely by 2027. In addition, if certain sectors continue to face competitive threats internationally, they will receive free allocations at the full benchmark level so long as the threat is determined to exist. The development of these sector-specific, EU-wide standards for free allocation was no small achievement.

المرجعية.

Perhaps no concept had been more advocated and less practiced during the NAP process for the first and second trading periods than benchmarking ( Ellerman, Buchner, and Carraro 2007 ). The basic problem was the lack of agreement on a suitable benchmark, which, when combined with the rushed conditions under which the NAPs were developed, made it inevitable that the basis for allocation would be historical emissions. The Amended Directive resolved this issue by requiring the EU-wide benchmarks to be the average emission rate per unit of output for those installations in each ETS sector constituting the 10 percent with the lowest CO 2 emission rates in 2005. Although defining sectors was a challenge, benchmarks were established for some fifty sectors before the end of phase II. Finally, these benchmarks were subject to an initial 6 percent reduction to reconcile the resulting free allocations with the previously decided EU-wide cap and amounts to be auctioned, and they will decrease by the same annual 1.74 percent factor that now governs the whole EU ETS ( OJEU 2018a ). With benchmarking resolved, the only remaining issue was deciding what to do with the revenue from auctioning.

Revenues from allowance auctioning.

A long-standing fiscal rule for the EU made revenues from allowance auctioning a nonissue. Brussels is to have no independent sources of revenue other than as provided by the member states through the 7-year budgets. Accordingly, revenues from the allowance auctions will be distributed to member states as “auction rights” established by a formula that is inversely, but loosely, related to per capita income ( Ellerman 2018 ).

In less than 10 years, the EU ETS evolved from a trading system in which largely sovereign nations initially demanded and received considerable discretion in cap-setting and allocation to one in which those decisions are system-wide, although still negotiated among the participating member states. In the end, national caps mean little in a system with full trading, and arguably what matters most to the participating governments is the equitable distribution among themselves of the value created by the constraint on emissions. The experience of the EU ETS shows that, although free allocation may be needed to gain initial buy-in of participating nations and their affected facilities, the initial allocation to the private sector of the value created by the cap is not forever and can be remarkably brief.

Thus far, we have discussed the EU ETS as if it were a stand-alone system without relation to international agreements or trading with other GHG systems. However, it is embedded in an international framework, and the international aspects of the EU ETS are a source of continuing change.

The Relationship to the KP and Linkage.

The EU ETS was proposed and justified as a means for the EU and its member states to meet their Kyoto obligations, but implementation was not made contingent on the KP entering into force, despite the considerable uncertainty surrounding that issue when the initial ETS Directive was adopted in 2003. Moreover, implementation of the EU ETS beyond 2018 (when Kyoto obligations ended) does not depend on other international agreements, although its implementation is often justified on the basis of the EU’s contribution to such agreements.

The EU’s evolution toward independent action can also be observed in the provisions for linkage, a generic term that refers to both the acceptance of international credits and mutual recognition with other cap-and-trade systems. Reliance on an international agreement is explicit in the Linking Directive’s effective delegation of the certifying authority for determining acceptable international offsets to the KP’s CDM and JI crediting procedures. Nevertheless, the EU retained its prerogative (as a buyer of credits) to impose a system-wide quantitative limit on their use and to prohibit the use of credits from certain types of projects, such as large hydro installations and nuclear-generating plants. Subsequently, the Amended Directive of 2009 stated that credits from new projects (those certified after 2018) would not be accepted absent a post-2018 international agreement to which the EU and the host country adhered or a bilateral agreement between the two. Moreover, credit use within phase III (2018–2020) was limited to about 300 additional credits beyond the 1.3 billion limit imposed in phase II. 8 Finally, the European Commission unilaterally announced in 2018 that CDM credits generated by industrial gas projects with high global-warming potential would not be accepted for compliance beyond 2018 under any circumstances ( OJEU 2018 ).

These tightened restrictions on credit use were coupled with provisions that make mutual recognition (unrestricted trading between two systems) easier. Whereas the 2003 ETS Directive limited mutual recognition to parties to the KP (i. e., national systems), the Amended Directive dropped all mention of the KP (or any international agreement), thereby clearing the way for bilateral agreements. In addition, it explicitly mentions potential linkage to subnational systems, as long as they have an absolute cap.

To date, there are two examples of mutual recognition, one with Australia, announced and subsequently abandoned, and the other under negotiation with Switzerland. 9 The distinguishing feature of these two examples of potential linkage by mutual recognition is that they are bilateral—that is, negotiated between the parties directly and not as part of a larger international agreement. The EU is also watching developments in the South Korean system and the pilot or national systems in China with an eye to eventual linkage.

These developments in restricting the use of project credits and opening up the potential for mutual recognition with other cap-and-trade systems reflect not only the willingness of the EU to act independently of international agreement but also an unstated policy of “graduating” countries that demonstrate the ability to generate project credits to full-fledged cap-and-trade programs that can be linked to the EU ETS, thereby forming the basis for an eventual global system of GHG emissions trading.

Before leaving the historical and contextual background of the EU ETS, we turn to the relationship of the ETS to other climate and energy policies in the EU.

Relationship to Other EU and Member-State Climate and Energy Policies.

Although the EU ETS has been heralded as the centerpiece of the EU’s climate policy, it is not the EU’s only climate policy instrument. In fact, the slogan for the EU’s present comprehensive climate policy is “20-20-20 by 2020,” which refers to the three targets to be achieved by 2020: a 20 percent reduction of GHG emissions from 1990 levels, a 20 percent share of total energy consumption from renewable energy, and a 20 percent improvement in energy efficiency. While the 20-20-20 slogan suggests that equal weight is being placed on achieving each of the three goals, their legal statuses vary. The GHG emissions-reduction and renewable energy–share targets are binding, whereas the energy-efficiency target is effectively aspirational, with no sanctions for noncompliance. 10.

It is important to note that the measures adopted by member states to achieve the renewable-energy and energy-efficiency targets affect the 40 percent of EU GHG emissions that are covered by the EU ETS. In particular, several member states, notably Germany and Spain, have provided strong incentives to develop wind and solar energy capacity within the electricity sector, such that the generation of electricity from renewable sources in these member states has had a demonstrable effect on the generation of electricity from CO 2 - emitting, fossil fuel–generating plants. For instance, in 2017 electricity generation from wind and solar accounted for 24 percent and 16 percent of total generation in Spain and Germany, respectively (ENTSO-E 2018). What remains to be seen is whether the concomitant reductions in demand for allowances will have a large or small effect on allowance prices. 11.

EU-level climate policy is not the only potential source of overlap with the EU ETS. Member states can adopt their own energy or climate policies, which may also affect that member state’s ETS emissions and thus affect the EU ETS-wide allowance price and distribution of abatement. For example, following the Fukushima accident in March 2018, the German government accelerated its policy to phase-out nuclear power by immediately shutting down eight reactors and directing the others to close down by 2022. Although one can debate how much zero-emission renewable energy can substitute for nuclear generation during and after the nuclear phase-out, the nuclear phase-out is likely to cause some increased reliance on fossil generation, both natural gas and coal-fired, and thus an increase in the demand for allowances and an increase in the EUA price.

In contrast, the UK’s carbon price floor is likely to have the opposite effect. In order to encourage investment in low-carbon generating capacity, the United Kingdom imposed a tax on fossil-fuel supplies to electricity-generating facilities in April 2018. Known as a carbon price support, the tax is supplementary to the EUA price and set at a level that will yield a carbon price of £16/ton CO 2 in 2018 and £30/ton CO 2 in 2020 (approximately €19/ton and €35/ton) when the EUA price and the UK price support will be combined. Given the current EUA price of around €8/ton, this measure imposes a significantly higher carbon cost on fossil-fuel electricity-generating facilities in the UK than in other EU member states. Thus, the UK carbon price floor can be expected to reduce coal and natural gas generation in the United Kingdom and hence the demand for allowances. As is the case for the other examples of overlapping policies, the direction of the effect on the EUA price is clear, but the magnitude is not.

Performance of the EU ETS.

With this background on the initial design, development, and implementation of the EU ETS, we now turn to a discussion of its performance through the end of phase II and into the first years of phase III.

Emission Reductions.

The first and most important measure of performance for any cap-and-trade system is emissions: that is, are emissions being reduced? Answering this question requires that we look at some of the determinants of CO 2 emissions, among which the level of economic activity is perhaps the most important.

Recent trends in emissions and economic activity.

Figure 1 compares the evolution of EU ETS emissions between 2004 and 2017 with the evolution of two measures of economic output: real gross domestic product (GDP) for the twenty-five EU member states that were initially part of the EU ETS (EU25) and the industrial component of real GDP—gross value added (GVA). GVA includes electricity generation and most closely approximates the underlying economic activity of the sectors included in the EU ETS. All three indices are normalized to the year 2004, the year preceding the start of the EU ETS.

Evolution of EU ETS emissions and economic output, 2004–2017.

Evolution of EU ETS emissions and economic output, 2004–2017.

As can be readily seen, the financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession had a noticeable effect on levels of economic activity and CO 2 emissions. And indeed the reduction of GVA in the industrial sector surely accounts for most of the reduction in ETS emissions observed between 2007 and 2009. However, since the low points in 2009, EU25 GDP has returned to its earlier level, and the corresponding GVA has recovered to within 5 percent of its earlier peak. CO 2 emissions have followed a different path. There was a 3.3 percent rebound in 2018 (compared with a 7.7 percent gain in industrial output), but since then, CO 2 emissions have continued to decline, and since 2018 have been lower than in 2009 despite the recovery in economic activity. Over the 10-year period (2004–2017), GDP and industrial output have increased at average annual rates of 0.92 percent and 0.55 percent, respectively, whereas CO 2 emissions have declined by an average annual rate of 2.1 percent. The ratio of ETS emissions to GDP has declined at an average rate of 3.0 percent, compared with a rate of decline of about 1 percent between 2000 and 2004 ( Ellerman, Convery, and de Perthuis 2018 , p. 164). These data suggest that there has been some decoupling of emissions and economic activity in recent years.

It is important to clarify that the line for emissions in figure 1 indicates CO 2 emissions from those installations participating in the ETS in 2005 and 2006. It does not account for the addition of new countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Norway, Iceland, and Liechtenstein) and sectors (aviation, chemicals, aluminum, and some non-CO 2 GHGs) since 2006. Over the years, these additions have expanded the coverage of the EU ETS by about 10 percent.

Another caveat is that other policy measures and the long-term trend toward increased energy efficiency have contributed to the reduction in CO 2 emissions within the EU ETS. As emphasized by Martin, Muûls, and Wagner (2018) , sorting out the effects of the CO 2 price from other factors is no easy task. Nevertheless, ETS emissions fell by 20 percent over the past 10 years, notwithstanding the recovered, albeit barely growing, levels of economic activity.

The long-term outlook.

Whatever the contribution of the EU ETS to the reduction in emissions shown in figure 1 , there can be no doubt about the future trend of emissions in the EU ETS. The declining cap will force emissions continually lower over time. And, as can be seen in figure 2 , the emissions are on track to meet that declining cap.

Long-term perspective on EU ETS sector emissions and cap, 1990–2050.

Long-term perspective on EU ETS sector emissions and cap, 1990–2050.

As in figure 1 , the data in figure 2 exclude the increases in the coverage of the ETS since 2005. Figure 2 also shows the amount by which the cap was increased in phase II through offsets surrendered in each year and the much smaller amount by which offsets will increase the cap in phase III. The area between emissions and the cap plus offsets through 2017 shows the cumulative amount of allowances banked to date. These allowances will likely be used in later years as costs rise, so emissions may rise above the cap for some years. However, there can be no doubt that the long-term trend of EU ETS emissions is downward, even without considering the increased rate of decline of the cap from 2020 that the commission has recently proposed ( European Commission 2017 , 2018a ).

Allowance Prices.

As the most visible manifestation of a cap-and-trade system, allowance prices receive a great deal of attention and are often viewed as indicating how well the system is functioning. We next provide an overview of price trends, a discussion of the effect of banking on price behavior, and data on the volume of emissions trading.

Overview of price trends.

As illustrated by figure 3 , a highly visible price for EUAs has existed since the beginning of the EU ETS in 2005. 12 This figure shows the prices of the next December futures contracts, which have become the main trading instruments in the EU ETS. 13.

Next December EUA futures prices in phase I and phases II and III.

Next December EUA futures prices in phase I and phases II and III.

The EUA price has varied considerably over the first 10 years of the EU ETS, particularly in late 2006 and during 2007, when the prices of phase I and phase II allowances also diverged significantly and as it became clear that phase I and phase II constituted separate markets with differing degrees of expected scarcity. When the EU ETS first started, the price of EUAs was expected to be between €5 and €10, and the prices obtained in early 2005 reflected this expectation. Soon thereafter, the EUA price rose quickly, triggering a debate over the reasons for the unexpectedly high price. The debate lasted until late April 2006, at which time several member states reported their emissions for 2005, with all being lower than expected. In response, the price for both phase I and phase II allowances fell significantly: by 50 percent and 30 percent, respectively. During the summer of 2006, the phase I price held at around €15, but as autumn began and as it became increasingly clear that phase I emissions would be below the cap, the price for phase I EUAs fell to a few euro cents, while the price of phase II EUAs remained generally between €15 and €20. As phase II began, the phase II price reached almost €30 before it fell again by about 50 percent as a result of the economic crisis of late 2008. This time, however, the price drop was not specific to the EU ETS; many other asset values (e. g., stocks, bonds, crude oil) experienced similar declines. After recovering somewhat in early 2009, the EUA price experienced a 2-year period of stability—with a price around €15—until the summer of 2018, when it fell again by around 50 percent, to a new low of €7–8 in 2018, before falling yet again, to around €4 as phase III began. Despite predictions by some observers that the price would again fall to zero, it did not, with €3.65 being the lowest price observed. In the 18 months since the all-time low at the beginning of 2018, the EUA price has risen steadily to more than twice the early 2018 low.

The influence of banking on allowance prices.

An examination of the price of EUAs at the end of phases I and II and the size of the allowance surplus accumulated in each phase highlights the importance of banking and its role in establishing a floor on prices. More specifically, the surplus was 83 million allowances at the end of phase I and 1.8 billion allowances at the end of phase II ( European Commission 2018b ), yet the price did not go to zero in 2018 as it did in 2007. This is because the phase I surplus allowances could not be carried over for use in phase II, whereas phase II allowances can be banked for use in phase III and later years when the cap will be even lower and prices are expected to be higher.

Trading of EUAs.

Initially, EUA trading was over-the-counter, as it had been for other cap-and-trade programs, such as the U. S. sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) Trading Program. However, organized exchanges started offering intermediary and hedging services shortly after the EU ETS began, and their share has grown steadily, accounting for as much as 80 percent of the trades in 2018, as shown in figure 4 .

Monthly volume of EUA trading.

Monthly volume of EUA trading.

Two trends are clear. First, the overall volume of trades involving EUAs has steadily increased over the life of the program. At the beginning, more than a year passed before trading exceeded 50 million allowances (or tons of emissions) a month. Over the next 5 years, trading volumes grew steadily to ten times that amount. The second trend is the already-noted shift in the location of trading (i. e., from over-the-counter to exchanges). While several exchanges offer intermediary and hedging services, such as Nordpool in Norway and EEX in Germany, the most important exchange has been the European Climate Exchange (ECX, now ICE) in London, which accounted for more than 90 percent of the exchange volume in 2018 ( Point Carbon 2018a ). Most of the transactions on these exchanges are for futures. Spot transactions have accounted for a small percentage of trades, and the leading exchange for spot transactions, BlueNext in Paris, closed at the end of 2018.

The EU ETS has conducted the world’s boldest experiment to date in the use of offsets. Most cap-and-trade systems (e. g., US SO 2 and nitrogen oxides trading, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, California CO 2 ) include provisions for offsets. However, such offsets are little (and often never) used because of the transaction costs of implementing monitoring, reporting, and verification procedures at off-system installations. The EU ETS broke new ground in two respects: it delegated offset certification authority to outside entities (i. e., those that already certify CDM and JI credits under the KP), and it imposed a quantitative limit on their use—approximately 11 percent of the phase II cap ( OJEU 2018b ). This experiment in offset use provides evidence on the use of offsets, their pricing relative to EUAs, and the origin of these substitute emission reductions, which we discuss next.

Offset issuance and use.

The EU ETS was not the sole market for CDM and JI credits; many were produced and bought by national governments throughout the world to satisfy obligations under the KP. However, the EU ETS was the largest single source of demand for these credits and the one with a relatively high price, thus providing considerable impetus for the creation of these credits. Table 1 presents data on the number of offsets submitted in lieu of EUAs to satisfy EU ETS compliance requirements through 2018 and the total number of these credits that were issued under the KP mechanisms (CDM and JI) in those years, including those used in the EU ETS.

Trends in numbers of EU ETS offsets surrendered and KP offsets issued.

Notes : Numbers are in millions. KP offset issuances correspond roughly to the compliance years of the ETS—that is, from May of the year indicated through April of the following year.

Several findings emerge from these data. First, half of the offsets issued under the KP through April 2018 were used for compliance in phase II of the ETS, reflecting the program’s status as the preferred, highest-return destination for these credits. Second, offset use started off very slowly, but it increased exponentially in the last three years of phase II, with half of the total offsets surrendered in 2018. Finally, the 1.3 billion phase II cap on offset use was not exceeded. Because unused entitlements to these credits (up to the phase II limit) can be converted to phase III allowances, the cumulative phase III cap will be higher by at least 240 million tons, and perhaps more, to the extent that credits from new projects are allowed within the additional 300 million limit for phase III.

Pricing of CERs versus EUAs.

Although the use of offsets (which were equal to about 10 percent of the phase II ETS cap) had some effect on the EUA price, the feature that has caught the most attention is the continual discount at which CERs (the primary source of credits until 2018) sold relative to EUAs despite being almost perfect substitutes for EUAs. 14 As shown in figure 5 , this discount ranged from 10 percent to 30 percent during the early years of phase II before increasing to 90 percent and higher in the final year of phase II.

EUA and CER pricing.

EUA and CER pricing.

It is clear from figure 5 that the CER price tracked the EUA price for most of phase II, albeit with a widening discount. However, since the beginning of 2018, that relationship appears to have ended. Contributing factors undoubtedly include the very limited acceptability of CERs in the EU ETS after 2018 and the absence of demand in the alternative Kyoto market. 15.

We next turn to an accounting of the types of projects undertaken to generate these offsets and the countries in which these projects were located.

Project categories and countries of origin.

The most notable feature of table 2 is the predominance of projects reducing non-CO 2 , high-global-warming-potential (GWP) greenhouse gases. Industrial gases (hydrofluorocarbon [HFC] and nitrogen dioxide [N 2 O]) have GWPs that are thousands of times higher than that of CO 2 (=1), whereas methane (CH 4 ) reductions have a value that is twenty times higher than that of CO 2 . This means that although the costs of reducing a ton of emissions from these non-CO 2 projects may be higher than those from CO 2 reductions, the evidence suggests that the size of the GWP, which determines how many credits are issued (with each credit equal to 1 ton of CO 2 - emission reduction), more than makes up for the cost difference.

Project categories for issued CERs and ERUs.

Notes: Numbers are in millions.

As shown in table 3 , the national origin of offset credits is also concentrated, with emerging economies, especially China, accounting for the bulk of the CERs issued and the Ukraine and Russia accounting for most of the ERUs issued. There is no overlap in the issuance of CERs and ERUs because ERUs could be issued only by nations listed in annex I of the KP (generally Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and former Soviet Union countries) and CERs could be issued only by countries that, unlike annex I signatories of the KP, were not obligated to limit GHG emissions. Although the “Others” category in table 3 includes many countries in both the CER and ERU categories, they constitute a small percentage of the totals.

Country of origin for issued CERs and ERUs.

Notes: Numbers are in millions.

Summary and Conclusions: Whither Phase III?

The great surprise of the second phase of the EU ETS was that, as phase III started in 2018, the price paid to emit carbon was less than €5, not the €30 or more that had been indicated by 2018 futures prices in 2008 and that was generally expected at that time. This development has created a lively debate about the future of the EU ETS and its role in climate policy. This debate can be summarized as being between those who view the current, much-lower-than-expected price as indicating serious flaws in the EU ETS and those who argue that the low price shows that the system is working exactly as it should given all that has happened since 2008 (i. e., reduced expectations for economic growth in the Eurozone, increased electricity generation from renewable sources, the significant use of offsets), including the possibility that abatement may be cheaper than initially expected. Fundamentally, this debate reflects differing views of the objectives of climate policy itself: whether the objective is solely to reduce GHG emissions or also (and perhaps principally) to transform the European energy system. Although no one is suggesting that emissions have exceeded the cap, or that they will do so, current prices do not seem likely to lead to the kind of technological transformation that would greatly reduce Europe’s reliance on fossil fuels. Since mid-2018, the debate about the future of the EU ETS has focused on three issues—back-loading, restructuring, and the 2030 targets.

Back-loading.

Back-loading refers to changing the scheduled quantities of auctioned allowances so that fewer are auctioned in the early years and more are auctioned in the later years of phase II. After some debate, the decision was made in February 2017 ( OJEU 2017 ) to withdraw 900 million allowances from auctioning in 2017–2018 and to add them back in to auctioning in 2019–2020. 16 The debate about back-loading was, however, not so much about the timing of auctioned quantities and its effect on EUA prices as it was a proxy for the more important issue of restructuring: whether to adopt more significant changes in the design of the EU ETS in order to provide a stronger incentive for low-carbon investment in Europe. Viewed from this perspective, back-loading was only a first step toward reducing the near-term quantity of allowances in order to provide time to build a consensus for taking tougher actions before the withdrawn allowances would be reinjected into the system.

Restructuring and Targets for 2030.

In November 2018, not long after the formal submission of the back-loading proposal, the commission published a report, State of the Carbon Market , in which six alternatives for “restructuring” the EU ETS were presented ( European Commission 2018 ): (1) increasing the EU reduction target to 30 percent in 2020, (2) retiring allowances in phase III, (3) early revision (downward) of the 1.74 percent annual reduction in the cap, (4) extending the scope of the ETS to other sectors, (5) limiting access to international credits, and (6) creating a discretionary price management mechanism.

This report was followed in March 2018 by a green paper on a 2030 framework for climate and energy policies ( European Commission 2018 ), which raised questions for debate about not only the restructuring of the EU ETS but also the post-2020 targets for renewable energy and energy efficiency and the coordination of those targets with the EU ETS. The context for this debate is both the absence of any post-2020 targets for the renewable energy and energy efficiency components of the present 20-20-20 by 2020 policy and the inability of the 1.74 percent annual reduction factor to reduce GHG emissions to 80 percent below 1990 emissions by 2050, the level called for in the 2050 Roadmap ( European Commission 2018 ).

A More Specific Proposal for 2030.

In January 2017, the commission followed up on the green paper with a more specific proposal for a comprehensive policy framework for climate and energy for 2020 to 2030 ( 2017 ). This proposal was remarkably sparse in recommendations for specific actions: a commitment to reduce EU GHG emissions by 40 percent below the 1990 level by 2030, the adoption of a Market Stability Reserve for the EU ETS that would withdraw and inject allowances after 2020 according to a quantitative formula, and an increase in the annual reduction in the EU-wide ETS cap after 2020, from 1.74 percent to 2.2 percent. The first two actions were presented as actions to be adopted in 2017: the 40 percent target in order to signal the EU’s contribution to the Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meeting in Paris in late 2018, and the Market Stability Reserve as a technical fix to stabilize EUA prices in the EU ETS. The tightening of the EU ETS cap, as well as other possible measures, was to be decided after the May 2017 elections and the appointment of a new commission in late 2017.

The most remarkable feature of the more specific 2030 proposal is the absence of targets for renewable energy and energy conservation. There is considerable discussion of accompanying policies, but it is general, without proposing the type of specific member-state targets that exist now. A renewable energy target of 27 percent by 2030 is proposed, but it is an EU-wide goal and explicitly not broken down into the member-state targets that would give it legal force. What emerges most clearly from this document is its focus on the ETS, without the accompanying ancillary policies at the EU level that characterize current policy.

Although consideration and adoption of the specific proposals for 2030 have been slower than originally expected, notable progress has still been made. The Ukrainian crisis bumped consideration of the 40 percent EU-wide GHG reduction goal for 2030 from the spring agenda, but it was taken up and approved in October 2017 ( European Council 2017 ). The proposal to establish the Market Stability Reserve could not be considered until the new commission was appointed, but it was quickly taken up and an amended version was approved by the European Parliament in July 2018 ( European Parliament 2018 ) and expected to receive final approval by the European Council later in 2018. This amended version moves the start of the Market Stability Reserve forward by two years, to 2019, in order to receive the 900 million “back-loaded” allowances. This means that these allowances will not be reinjected into the system in 2019–2020. Finally, in July 2018, the commission forwarded the formal legislative proposal to increase the rate of decline in the post-2020 cap from 1.74 percent to 2.2 percent ( European Commission 2018a ). Stakeholder consultations and debate in the European Parliament and among member states will now occur as this final concrete proposal from the 2030 package moves toward final adoption.

Concluding Comments.

As the broader debate about climate and energy policy continues, it is important to keep in mind what has been achieved by the EU ETS. Absent a decision by the EU to abandon the program, which would require a super-majority, the EU ETS will march on with a continually declining cap, which, under all likely scenarios, will create continuing scarcity, thus virtually guaranteeing that a carbon price will be a permanent feature of the European economic landscape. Although one could question whether the consensus exists to tighten the EU ETS cap, repeal of the EU ETS appears highly unlikely. Moreover, if the current consensus no longer supports enforceable member-state targets for renewable energy, as seems to be the case, the EU ETS will be the only EU climate instrument in force after 2020. Thus, the EU ETS appears to be here to stay, and this remarkable experiment in climate policy will no doubt continue to provide economists and policy makers with fertile ground for research and debate for many years to come.

المراجع.

تنبيهات البريد الإلكتروني.

Companion Articles.

مقالات ذات صلة في.

نقلا عن مقالات عبر.

Online ISSN 1750-6824 Print ISSN 1750-6816 Copyright © 2018 Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.

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